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FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS: HOW REGULATIONS CAN RESTORE PUBLIC
TRUST IN THE MEDIA
Sarah Clemens*
Journalists face a credibility crisis, plagued by chants of fake news
and a crowded rat race in the primetime ratings. Critics of the media look at
journalists as the problem. Within this domain, legal scholarship has
generated a plethora of pieces critiquing media credibility with less attention
devoted to how and why public trust of the media has eroded. This Note offers
a novel explanation and defense. To do so, it asserts the proposition that
deregulating the media contributed to the proliferation of fake news and led
to a decline in public trust of the media. To support this claim, this Note first
briefly examines the historical underpinnings of the regulations that once
made television broadcasters “public trustees” of the news. This Note also
touches on the historical role of the Public Broadcasting Act that will serve
as the legislative mechanism under which media regulations can be amended.
Delving into what transpired as a result of deregulation and prodding
the effects of limiting oversight over broadcast, this Note analyzes the current
public perception of broadcast news, putting forth the hypothesis that
deregulation is correlated to a negative public perception of broadcast news.
This Note analyzes the effect of deregulation by exploring recent examples of
what has emerged as a result of deregulation, including some of the most
significant examples of misinformation in recent years. In so doing, it
discusses reporting errors that occurred ahead of the Iraq War, analyzes how
conspiracy theories spread in mainstream broadcast, and discusses the effect
of partisan reporting on public perception of the media.
Finally, this Note proposes creating an Independent Broadcast
Council under the regulatory authority of the Federal Communications
Commission that would oversee the reintroduction of a revised Fairness
Doctrine using the existing statutory framework from the Public
Broadcasting Act. Lastly, this Note addresses the implications of
reimplementing regulations on the media, including addressing the First
Amendment counterarguments as well as U.S. Supreme Court and court of
appeals cases that suggest courts would uphold this proposal.
*

2019-2020 Deputy Managing Editor, Concordia Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Concordia
University School of Law, 2021.
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INTRODUCTION
“[W]herever the people are well informed they can be trusted with
their own government.”1 For Americans, broadcast news remains the most
popular source from which to receive that information.2 As a source of
information to the American public, the importance of media credibility
cannot be overstated. A public informed by objective facts can make educated
decisions based upon those facts.
When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began
licensing broadcast television stations, it did so under the premise that
broadcasters were “public trustees” who had the privilege and responsibility
of using public airwaves to inform the public.3 This model and regulatory
scheme ushered in half a century of public confidence in not only broadcast,
but in the men and woman who provided the news.4 Yet, beginning with the
FCC’s decision to abandon the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, broadcast
underwent a significant deregulatory process throughout the 1980s and 1990s
that eliminated many assurances the public had that information was fair and
balanced.5
Public perception of media credibility in the United States reached its
lowest level in polling history in 2016.6 Almost two-thirds of Americans
1
Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, THE LIBRARY OF CONG. (Jan. 8, 1789),
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/60.html.
2
Rick Edmonds, Pew Research Finds That Broadcast is the Favorite Source for Local News,
POYNTER (March 26, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2019/pew-researchfinds-that-broadcast-is-the-favorite-source-for-local-news-and-weather-is-the-most-valuedtopic/. According to a survey of 35,000 adults released by the Pew Research Center, thirtyeight percent of adults receive their news from broadcast television compared to twenty-two
percent from radio and seventeen percent from the daily newspaper. Id.
3
Priscilla Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying it to Information
Privacy Policy, 76 MD. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2017).
4
See generally DRAFT Chapter 3: The New Media Landscape, MEDIUM (June 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/trust-media-and-democracy/draft-chapter-3-the-new-media-landscape4a3e8a89b661#05c9 [hereinafter The New Media Landscape]. In the mid-20th Century,
with the rise of broadcast television and the implementation of the Fairness Doctrine, the
definition of “news” was clear and there was less disagreement about what a “fact” was, but
once the Fairness Doctrine was repealed the agreement began to disintegrate. Id. Trust in
media began to erode as the line blurred between news reporting and news analysis. Id.
5
See infra Part I. For a scholarly discussion on the possibility of extending regulations to
cable news, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see Nareissa L. Smith, Consumer
Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas: A Proposal to Extend the News Distortion Doctrine
to Cable Television News Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 223, 228 (2015).
6
Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx.
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believe that the media publishes fake news.7 Moreover, the perception of
media credibility divides sharply among party lines.8 This perception of fake
news was bolstered in recent years by a politician who calls the press “the
enemy of the people.”9 “The Fake News Media has NEVER been more
Dishonest or Corrupt than it is right now. There has never been a time like
this in American History . . . Fake News is the absolute Enemy of the People
and our Country itself!”10 Nonetheless, the issue of credibility in the media
transcends a political campaign or presidency. Though the reason for a
decline in public perception of the media is varied, this Note proposes that
regulating broadcast news would fundamentally contribute to a decline in the
perception that the media is fake news by increasing accuracy and
transparency in broadcast media.11
In the current regulatory environment, broadcast news is no longer
under an obligation to provide contrasting viewpoints or discuss issues of
public importance, though such a requirement was once a prerequisite to a
broadcast license.12 Despite challenges to its constitutionality, the Supreme
Court upheld the requirement.13 Moreover, existing legislation that created
an independent corporation to uphold programming standards for viewers
extended only to educational stations but was never intended to regulate
broadcast news.14
This Note asserts the proposition that deregulating the media
7

Ian Buchanan, The Media’s Credibility Crisis, THE CHRONICLE (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/09/the-medias-credibility-crisis (The data from
the poll comes from a Harvard-Harris poll provided exclusively to The Hill); See also
Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Says Mainstream Media Publishes Fake News, THE HILL
(May 24, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/334897-poll-majoritysays-mainstream-media-publishes-fake-news.
8
Buchanan, supra note 7 (highlighting a 2016 Gallup poll showed that Democrats’ and
Independents’ trust in the media decreased slightly while Republicans attribute unfair and
negative coverage of Donald Trump to a sharp decline in trust, reaching only fourteen
percent).
9
Stephanie Sugars, From Fake News to Enemy of the People: An Anatomy of Trump’s
Tweets, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jan. 30, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://cpj.org
/blog/2019/01/trump-twitter-press-fake-news-enemy-people.php.
10
Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (March 19, 2019, 5:24 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1107981131012628481?lang=en (capitalization
emphasis in original).
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part I.A.
13
See infra Part I.B.
14
See infra Part I.C.
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contributed to the proliferation of fake news and led to a decline in public
trust of the media. It asserts that to combat these issues and restore
broadcasters to the role of “public trustees,” the government must
reimplement a modern-day version of the Fairness Doctrine. To do so, this
Note proposes creating an Independent Broadcast Council, independent of
partisan politics, with a central focus of guaranteeing that broadcasters
uphold their role as public trustees. It does so under framework consistent
with existing law.15
Moreover, this Note proposes that amending the existing Public
Broadcasting Act to expand the scope of legislation to encompass broadcast
news and incorporate the key tenets of the Fairness Doctrine would
significantly improve public perception of the media.16 The revised
legislation would define the term fake news and warn consumers when it aired
by creating a rating system.17
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I lays out the historical
background of broadcast regulation in the United States. In so doing, it
examines the key legislative and judicial decisions that led to the current
regulatory environment. Part II analyzes the premise of fake news and how it
contributes to negative public perception of the media before evaluating three
recent examples of circumstances in which the media portrayed stories in a
biased or factually unclear way that materially contributed to a decline in
public trust. Part III introduces the proposal for an Independent Broadcast
Council and identifies the framework under which the council would
function. Moreover, it analyzes the three examples discussed in Part II under
the context of the newly proposed guidelines to hypothesize how the
reporting may have led to a different outcome had the council had an
oversight role. Finally, Part III examines how these regulations have
succeeded in other countries and shows how a current Supreme Court would
likely hold on challenges raised against the regulations by reconciling two
cases.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This Part draws on historical research to trace the deregulation of
broadcast television. Along the way, it reveals the genesis of the Fairness
15

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
17
See infra Part III.B.
16
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Doctrine and the Public Broadcast Act. In so doing, this Note evaluates the
repercussions of deregulating the broadcast industry and examines how
courts and legislatures have struggled to balance the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech against the public trustee obligations that broadcast
media were once entrusted with to provide fair and balanced coverage.
A.

An Era of Broadcast Regulation

The history of broadcast regulation in the United States is intricate
and multifaceted. Even so, the evolution of the agencies charged with
overseeing broadcast follows a relatively linear path. This Subpart provides
an abbreviated history of broadcast regulation to help aid understanding about
why certain regulations failed, why others succeeded, and what transpired as
the result of deregulation.
The Radio Act of 1912 was the first act of legislation that required
licenses for radio stations.18 The Act’s passage occurred following
government concern that radio interference had contributed to a delay in the
rescue of passengers on the Titanic the night it sank.19 At the time of the
Radio Act, the Commerce Department monitored radio, but with
technological advances the government recognized a need for a regulatory
body that could respond to the unique demands of radio at the time.20 Shortly
thereafter, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.21 This revised legislation
established the Federal Radio Commission, but by 1934 the regulatory body
was supplanted by the Federal Communications Commission.22
A review of early legislation reveals the concern many in Congress
had with the advent of television and radio and the potential this new
technology possessed as a political tool.23 Texas Representative Luther
Johnson shared his concerns ahead of a debate on the Radio Act of 1927:
18

H.R. REP. NO. 741 (1912), https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/artifact/s-6412-actregulate-radio-communication-radio-act-1912-may-20-1912.
19
Id.
20
Jennifer Davis, Anniversary of the Radio Act of 1927, The Beginning of Broadcast
Regulation, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Feb. 23, 2016), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2016/02
/anniversary-of-the-radio-act-of-1927-the-beginning-of-broadcast-regulation/.
21
Act of Feb. 23, 1927, Ch. 169; 44 Stat. 1162.
22
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1996).
23
But see Rebecca Ruiz, Reaction to Regulation: 1934 vs. Today, N.Y. TIMES (March 5,
2015, 6:32 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/reaction-to-regulation-1934-vstoday/ (describing the reaction two senators had in 1934 to the proposed passage of the
Communications Act of 1934, calling the legislation “overreaching” and an attempt to
“censor the press”).

2020

FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS

225

American thought and American politics will be largely at the
mercy of those who operate these stations, for publicity is the
most powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic.
And when such a weapon is placed in the hands of one person,
or a single selfish group is permitted to either tacitly or
otherwise acquire ownership or dominate these broadcasting
stations throughout the country, then woe be to those who dare
to differ with them. It will be impossible to compete with them
in reaching the ears of the American people.24
The FCC emerged out of the Communications Act of 1934.25 At that time,
broadcast television was in its infancy, and the FCC was created to regulate
and expand the availability of communication to people across the United
States.26
The premise behind the Communications Act was simple: those who
wished to broadcast on television or radio could do so only with a license,
and Congress required that the FCC grant a license only to those who would
serve the public interest.27 To comply with this responsibility, the FCC
showed a preference toward granting and renewing licenses to stations that
presented more than one view.28 That said, what began as a preference by the
FCC evolved into a mandate after it published the report In the Matter of
Editorializing by the Broadcast Licensees.29 As a result, the guidelines that
would govern broadcasters for nearly 40 years became known as the Fairness
Doctrine.30
The Fairness Doctrine had two primary requirements for a
broadcaster to obtain a license. First, “every licensee [must] devote a
24

Steve Rendall, The Fairness Doctrine: How We Lost it and Why We Need it Back,
SISYPHUS (July 2018), https://sisyphuslitmag.org/2018/07/the-fairness-doctrine-how-welost-it-and-why-we-need-it-back/.
25
Id. (stating that the purpose of the Communications Act was to “regulat[e] interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States”).
26
Id.
27
47 U.S.C.A. § 307 (2004).
28
See Kathleen Ann Ruane, Fairness Doctrine: History and Constitutional Issues, CONG.
RES. SERV (2011).
29
See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d REP. 1246, 1246–70 (1949). The
report was first iteration of the Fairness Doctrine, which set out the requirements for
broadcasters to devote time to controversial issues and air opposing views. Id.
30
Id. at 1264 (referring to the guidelines as “the doctrine of fairness.”).
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reasonable portion of broadcast time to the discussion and consideration of
controversial issues of public importance.”31 Second, “in doing so [the
broadcaster be] fair—that is, that [the broadcaster] affirmatively endeavor to
make. . . facilities available for the expression of contrasting viewpoints held
by responsible elements with respect to the controversial issues presented.”32
Additional requirements under the Fairness Doctrine were later
imposed, including the “personal attack rule” which required broadcasters to
notify a person who was the subject of a personal attack within one week and
required the broadcaster to allow the individual an opportunity to respond on
air.33 The regulation also required broadcasters that endorsed a political
candidate to allow other candidates an equal opportunity to respond.34
The premise of the Fairness Doctrine was based on the concept that
television broadcasters were “public trustees.”35 Unlike newspapers, the
airwaves for broadcast television were believed to be finite.36 This “scarcity
concept” meant that broadcasters who used the public airwaves should
provide a public service.37 Because the federal government licensed
broadcasters, the theory was that the networks should air competing
perspectives designed to foster a fair debate on controversial issues.38
In many ways, it is unsurprising the Fairness Doctrine emerged in
1949. The political and media landscape in the United States in the early
1950s bred an atmosphere of distrust among the American public, and for the
first time in American history, the coverage played out live across television.
In the early 1950s, Americans were told to fear Communism—to be
31

Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10426 (1964).
32
Id. (original punctuation preserved).
33
47 C.F.R. § 73.123–73.300 (1974).
34
Id. (articulating that though the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to provide equal
time to other candidates if the station endorsed a candidate, the rule was separate from the
Equal Time rule which is still in effect); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (1994).
35
See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)
(“[L]icensee’s role developed in terms of a ‘public trustee’ charged with the duty of fairly
and impartially informing the public audience.”).
36
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); see also Josephine Soriano, The
Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is It Time to Reevaluate Red Lion’s Scarcity
Rationale? 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 341, 343 (2006) (explaining that broadcast media uses
electromagnetic spectrum to transmit signal, and there are a limited number of signals that
can occupy the spectrum).
37
John W. Berresford, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating Traditional Broadcasting: An
Idea Whose Time Has Past, 2 MEDIA BUREAU STAFF RES. PAPER (2005).
38
See Ruane, supra note 28.
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watchful of their neighbors, their teachers, their news anchors.39 The Red
Scare and Cold War dominated nightly news in the late 1940s and early
1950s.40 Despite the rampant fear that swept across the nation and consumed
the public and public figures alike, Americans largely trusted broadcast
news.41 Perhaps this is why when Edward R. Murrow, a renowned and
respected journalist for CBS, spoke on March 9, 1954, on his television
program See it Now and warned against the dangers of McCarthyism, the
audience listened.42 In this broadcast, Murrow looked directly into the camera
and condemned McCarthy and his claim of rampant Communism:
We proclaim ourselves, as indeed we are, the defenders of
freedom—what's left of it but we cannot defend freedom
abroad by deserting it at home. The actions of the junior
Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay
amongst our allies abroad and given considerable comfort to
our enemies. And whose fault is that? Not really his. He didn't
create this situation of fear. He merely exploited it, and rather
successfully. Cassius was right: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not
in our stars, but [i]n ourselves.”43
The more illustrative point to Edward R. Murrow’s speech condemning
Joseph McCarthy during the infamous See it Now broadcast is not that the
American public listened,44 though they did, but that in spite of the fear and
distrust in America at that time, people trusted the news.45 Moreover, Murrow
and others like him could speak out against Communism, the Vietnam War,
39

Landor Storrs, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA
AM. HIST. 1 (July 2015).
40
Id.
41
See The New Media Landscape, supra note 4.
42
Joseph Wershba, Murrow v. McCarthy: See it Now, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 1979),
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/04/archives/murrow-vs-mccarthy-see-it-now.html.
43
Id.
44
Id. Following Murrow’s address to the country, CBS said it received the largest response
in broadcast history from the American public: 12,348 phone calls within a few hours.
Though McCarthy’s reputation had begun to decline, Murrow’s public address is largely
credited with demonstrating the role that television journalism once had in shaping American
society. See Edward Walsh, When Television Took on Joe McCarthy, WASH. POST (March
11, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/ 1994/03/11/when-televisiontook-on-joe-mccarthy/46f3f817-b0a8-432f-8c68-db4f906a5b01/.
45
See Edward R. Murrow, FILM & HISTORY (June 20, 2016), http://www.uwosh.edu/
filmandhistory/documentary/americanhistory1/murrow.php (referring to Edward R. Murrow
at the time of McCarthy broadcast as “the most trusted man in America”).
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and culturally significant events in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s without
violating the Fairness Doctrine.
Even so, some have argued that the Fairness Doctrine chilled free
46
speech; this was and remains the primary motive for its repeal.47 Yet the
Supreme Court has never held that the Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional
or contravened the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.48 In part, this is
because of the medium.
The FCC licenses broadcasters to use the airwaves, and though they
have the right to speak, the right is confined by the mechanism.49 Yet a wave
of challenges and policy concerns throughout the 1980s would ultimately
lead the FCC to abandon the Doctrine, and with it, the ideal that broadcasters
had a responsibility to serve as public trustees.
B.

Challenging Constitutionality

In 1985, the FCC issued a report entitled the 1985 Fairness Report.50
The report was published as an evaluation of the Fairness Doctrine.51 The
Commission concluded that the “fairness doctrine . . . disserve[d] the public
interest.”52 The FCC also concluded that the second prong of the Doctrine,
which required broadcasters to air opposing viewpoints, had a chilling effect
on news coverage.53 Even so, the Commission did not repeal the Doctrine
after that conclusion because the FCC was under the mistaken assumption
that the Doctrine had been codified in a 1959 amendment to Title 47 of the
United States Code, section 315.54
46

See Adam Thierer, Why the Fairness Doctrine is Anything But Fair, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Oct. 29, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/whythe-fairness-doctrine-anything-fair (arguing that the Fairness Doctrine put too much
regulatory power under FCC control and allowed for arbitrary enforcement); see also Robert
Mulholland, The Fairness Doctrine is Unfair to the Public, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 30,
1989), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-30-8902050312-story.html
(suggesting that the Fairness Doctrine allowed the government to control what content a
station aired).
47
Ruane, supra note 28, at 5.
48
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
49
See infra Part I.B. (highlighting in the subsequent court decisions the court’s rationale in
determining that broadcast is different than print media).
50
102 F.C.C.2d REP. 145 (1985).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 148.
53
Id. at 155.
54
See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1959). In 1959, Congress amended the
Communications Act of 1934. Congress revised section 315 to include language that stated
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Yet, the report, critical of the Fairness Doctrine and suggestive of its
negative implications on the First Amendment, set the stage for a series of
court challenges that ultimately empowered the FCC to repeal it in 1987.55
1.

Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc., v. FCC

Before the FCC’s abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, the
policies that governed broadcast licenses for the second half of the twentieth
century faced intense scrutiny in the courts.56 Yet, in 1969, the Supreme
Court demonstrated it was willing to uphold the principles behind the
Fairness Doctrine.57 Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC involved two cases
that challenged the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine and the statutory
basis that had supported it.58
The case centered on a man named Fred J. Cook who had authored a
book entitled Goldwater—Extremist on the Right.59 Red Lion Broadcasting
was licensed to operate a radio station, and the station broadcast a segment
by Reverend Billy James Hargis that discussed Cook’s book.60 During the
broadcast, Hargis made a series of allegations against Cook, including
alleging that he had been fired for making false statements, that he worked
for a publication associated with Communism, that he attacked the Central
Intelligence Agency, and that his book was an attempt to destroy Berry
Goldwater.61
a broadcaster shall afford a reasonable opportunity to discuss conflicting views. That said,
the FCC relied on a D.C. Circuit Court decision, Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC,
806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.1986), which stated, “[h]ad Congress affirmatively intended to
make the fairness doctrine a statutory command, it surely would have employed a more direct
and less offhanded approach…” Id. at 1119. The dissent strongly maintained that the Fairness
Doctrine had been codified, stating, “[a]s Judge Robinson explained for the court, ‘[the]
language placed in Section 315(a) in 1959. . . codifies the fairness doctrine formulated by
the Commission in 1949.’ Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 438
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377–78, 89 S. Ct. at 1799–1800).” Id. at 1117.
Even so, the FCC elected to discontinue adherence to the Doctrine determining that it was
never codified.
55
See In re Syracuse Peace Counsel, 2 FCC RCD. 5043, 5050 (1987).
56
See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (declining to reverse the ruling of
the FCC that rejected a complaint by groups under the fairness doctrine); Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (affirming a ruling by the FCC to requiring television
and radio stations to devote equal airtime to present a case against cigarette smoking).
57
See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
58
Id. at 370.
59
Id. at 371.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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After the broadcast, Cook sought to invoke his free reply time,
determining he had been personally attacked on air.62 Despite the FCC policy
mandating the air time, Red Lion refused.63 Following an exchange between
Cook, Red Lion, and the FCC, the FCC determined that Cook was entitled to
a chance to respond.64
The Supreme Court went through an exhaustive history of the
Doctrine and detailed the legislative intent behind it.65 The Court reasoned
that the Fairness Doctrine was a “legitimate exercise of congressionally
delegated authority” to the FCC.66 Specifically, the Court addressed the First
Amendment issues raised by broadcasters and the contention that the First
Amendment protected broadcaster’s right to exclude who they choose from
the broadcast, holding that no person can be prevented from publishing what
he thinks and that such a right extends equally to broadcasters.67
Yet it was this comparison of broadcast to other mediums of
publication in an argument of First Amendment protection in which the Court
disagreed.68 There were differences in how the First Amendment applied to
the medium of broadcast, the Court determined.69 The Court pointed to the
government’s ability to limit sound-amplifying equipment, but suggested that
in so doing, the government was not impeding free speech.70
Underpinning the Court’s rationale behind Red Lion was the scarcity
argument:71
If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10
frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same ‘right’
to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication
by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred
from the airwaves.72
62

Id. at 372; see also In re Amendment of Part 73, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, 722 (1967) (highlight
that the FCC codified its longstanding personal attack and political editorial rules which
allowed a person to invoke airtime in the context of the discussion of a controversial issue if
a personal attack occurred).
63
Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 372.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 375–387.
66
Id. at 385.
67
Id. at 386.
68
Id. at 387.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
71
Id. at 388–89.
72
Id.
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Moreover, the Court determined it was “the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters,” that was important.73 In its reasoning, the
Court acknowledged that the FCC could have required broadcasters to share
the frequencies.74 Instead, the Court recognized that the government elected
to bestow upon the broadcasters selected for a license a responsibility to act
as a public trustee—a requirement that in exchange for the free use of public
airwaves, the licensee would offer reasonable time to those with a different
view or those who had been publicly attacked.75 The Court reasoned that the
First Amendment granted no right to a licensee that enabled them to prevent
others from speaking on the broadcast and granted no unconditional use of a
resource to which others had been denied access.76
The Court emphasized the use of licenses in its Red Lion opinion to
uphold the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine. “Licenses to broadcast
do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary
privilege of using them.”77 The Red Lion Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Fairness Doctrine, 78 and held that the FCC’s regulations in the
Doctrine were authorized by statute and the Constitution.79 Though the
Court’s decision has never been directly challenged, subsequent appellate
decisions undermined its rationale.
2.

Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC

In 1986, a case called Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC
(TRAC) came before the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit.80
Judge Robert Bork and future Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
questioned the legitimacy of the Fairness Doctrine in the opinion.81 The
decision, written by Judge Bork, challenged the Supreme Court to “one day
revisit this area of law and either eliminate the distinction between print and
broadcast media . . . or announce a constitutional distinction that is more
usable than the present one.”82
73

Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
Id.
75
Id. at 391.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 394 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934)).
78
Id. at 396.
79
Id. at 401.
80
See generally Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
81
See generally id.
82
Id. at 509.
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The case centered on a challenge to the FCC’s decision not to apply
the regulations of the Fairness Doctrine to a technology known as teletext.83
The FCC argued that the Fairness Doctrine should not extend to a technology
that did not exist when the Doctrine was created and maintained that applying
the Doctrine was at the sole discretion of the Commission.84 The FCC also
argued that teletext was a hybrid of print and broadcast, which did not subject
it to the scarcity rationale outlined in Red Lion.85
Unlike Red Lion, which was concerned exclusively with broadcast,
the FCC sought to distinguish the argument in TRAC by claiming that
regulating teletext implicated the First Amendment because it regulated print
media, which the Court had determined in a prior decision was not subject to
right-of-reply.86 The FCC attempted to differentiate teletext from broadcast
in TRAC by arguing that textual media, unlike airwaves, was not scarce.
However, that argument was unconvincing to the D.C. Circuit.
The court determined that “[t]he dispositive fact is that teletext is
transmitted over broadcast frequencies that the Supreme Court has ruled
scarce and this makes teletext's content regulable.”87 Though the FCC lost the
appeal,88 the court struck the first major blow to the Doctrine by holding that
the Doctrine was not statutory law, but rather was created by the FCC and as
such, could be repealed by the FCC.89 This was the first recognition that the
Doctrine had not been codified.
3.

Meredith Corp. v. FCC

The FCC’s last barrier to eliminating the Fairness Doctrine was
removed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals the next year in Meredith Corp
v. FCC.90 A station owned by Meredith Corp. was accused of violating the
Fairness Doctrine for refusing to allow response time to a public attack.91

83

Id. at 502 (noting that teletext was a new technology that transmitted graphics onto
television screens for home viewing).
84
Id. at 504.
85
See id.
86
See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down a statute
that applied to newspapers requiring editorial columns to provide a right to reply).
87
Telecom. Research and Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 508.
88
Id. at 502.
89
Id. at 517.
90
See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
91
Id. at 865–66.
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Concurrent to the case, the FCC’s Fairness Report was issued.92 The report
concluded that the Doctrine did not serve the public interest, but the
Commission failed to repeal the Doctrine at that time.93 The D.C. Circuit
questioned the Commission’s unwillingness to declare where it stood on the
policies that had long governed broadcasters:
[T]he Commission refused to decide whether the fairness
doctrine was self-generated pursuant to its general
congressional authorization or specifically mandated by
Congress. Of course, the fair inference to be drawn from the
Commission's report was that the Commission believed the
doctrine was not specifically mandated; otherwise, it would
have been irresponsible for the Commission gratuitously to
cast constitutional doubt on a congressional command.
Nonetheless, because the Commission felt intense political, if
not legal, pressure from Congress, it chose not to reach a final
conclusion regarding the origins of the doctrine. We think,
however, the Commission was obliged to resolve that issue, at
least in the context of an enforcement proceeding in which a
party raises a constitutional defense.94
The D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the FCC to consider the
constitutional arguments, noting, “the Commission need not confront that
issue if it concludes that in light of its Fairness Report it may not or should
not enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the public interest.”95
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Red Lion, once the Fairness
Report was published, the FCC elected to stop enforcing the Doctrine under
the Reagan administration in 1987.96 That year, Congress voted to codify the
regulations embodied in the Doctrine, but Reagan vetoed the measure, stating
“[t]his type of content-based regulation by the federal government is, in my
judgment, antagonistic to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”97
92

See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d REP. 145 (1985).
See supra Part I.B.
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Meredith Corp., 809 F.2d at 872–73.
95
Id. at 874.
96
Tim Dickinson, So Long, Fairness Doctrine, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:11 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/ politics/politics-news/so-long-fairness-doctrine-75444/.
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Penny Pagano, Reagan’s Veto Kills Fairness Doctrine Bill, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 1987,
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The political landscape of broadcast networks changed almost
immediately. According to the Media Access Project, after the repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine there has been less coverage of issues; television news had
decreased locally and nationally.98 The Federal Communications Law
Journal determined that 25 percent of broadcast stations no longer offer any
local news or public affairs programming.99 But more disconcerting is the
proliferation of partisan reporting. Less than a year after the FCC abolished
the Fairness Doctrine, Rush Limbaugh launched his talk radio show,
polarizing talk radio.100 Rising out of the demise of the Doctrine are names
such as Sean Hannity and Bill O’Reilly.101
C.

A New Standard of Regulation: Public Broadcasting Act

Whereas most of the legislation addressed in Part I of this Note is in
reference to repealed regulations, this Subpart addresses the passage of
legislation that imposed regulation on broadcasters. Though seemingly
disconnected from the Fairness Doctrine, the history of this legislation is
critical to understanding the proposal discussed infra Part III.102
In 1967, Congress passed Public Law 90-129 to amend the
Communications Act of 1934.103 The amendment became known as the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.104 The Act provided federal aid to public
broadcasting, but more importantly, it created the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).105 The CPB
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-06-21-mn-8908-story.html.
98
Rendall, supra note 24.
99
Id.
100
Mark Gunther, The Transformation of Network News, NIEMAN REPORTS (June 15, 1999),
https://niemanreports.org/articles/the-transformation-of-network-news/.
101
Id. The demise of the Fairness Doctrine saw the emergence of major conservative voices.
For additional discussion regarding potential reasons for this, see Nicole Hemmer, The
Conservative War on Liberal Media Has a Long History, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/the-conservative-war-on-liberalmedia-has-a-long-history/283149/ (“Conservatives saw the media landscape differently. . . .
Because of this, the right believed fairness did not require a response to conservative
broadcasts; conservative broadcasts were the response. Unable to bring the FCC around to
their position, conservatives increasingly saw the commission as a powerful government
agency dedicated to maintaining media’s liberal tilt.”).
102
See infra Part III.
103
An Act of Nov. 7, 1967 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365.
104
See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390–99 (1976).
105
See id.; see also Robert Avery, Why Public Broadcasting?, NAT’L COMM. ASS’N (Oct. 1,
2007), https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/why-public-broadcasting. The Act
also created National Public Radio (NPR). Id.
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was funded by the federal government as a conduit of federal funding for the
public media.106 The corporation functioned as an umbrella organization to
support public media operations, but did not, and does not, operate broadcast
stations.107 On the other hand, PBS was established under the Act as a
membership organization to work in partnership with other stations and
provide public programming and educational programming.108 By design,
PBS is limited to educational programming.109
Though the legislation was intended to create a public broadcasting
network that rivaled the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), it had
fundamental flaws that prevented it from ever reaching the idealism
envisioned by drafters.110 First, the governing body of the CPB was intended
to be nonpartisan, with the objective that the Board of Directors would protect
the organization from political interference.111 Yet, when the Act passed, the
legislation required a fifteen-member Board whose appointees would be
decided by the president.112 Second, the intended funding mechanism for the
Act did not make it into the bill.113 The result was a struggle to obtain
congressional funding each fiscal year.114
Despite its flaws, the Public Broadcasting Act has existed for more
than fifty years. Since its founding, it adopted a code of integrity, code of
ethics, and charter that govern both the media organizations overseen by the
corporation and the employees within the corporation.115 Members of the
CPB adopted a charter outlining principles aimed at strengthening trust and
integrity of the public media. The charter specifies a commitment to “[a]im
for transparency in news gathering, reporting, and other content creation and
share the reasons for important editorial and programming choices.”116
106

CPB FAQ, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, https://www.cpb.org/faq#1-2 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2020).
107
Id.
108
Mission, IDAHO PUB. TELEVISION, http://www.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/missionstatement/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
109
Overview, IDAHO PUB. TELEVISION (Aug. 2018), http://www.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/
overview/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
110
Avery, supra note 105.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Ombudsman, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, https://www.cpb.org/ombudsman/about
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
116
Code of Integrity, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, http://www.codeofintegrity.org/ (last
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Moreover, the public media seeks to “[p]romote the common good, the public
interest, and these commitments to integrity and trustworthiness in
organizational governance, leadership, and management.”117
Of note, the CPB charter established the position of ombudsman as an
independent observer of public broadcasting. The position is independent of
the CPB and was created in 2005 as the result of a “clear need for a ‘systemwide process of exerting upward pressure on the standards of taste and
performance.’”118 The ombudsman works to encourage high standards in
public broadcasting.119 The benefit of public broadcasting is difficult to
overstate. Research shows that, unlike its commercial counterpart, the public
news audience is better-informed120 and more likely to vote.121 The audience
also has smaller disparities in knowledge between social groups.122
II.

REPORTING LIVE FROM THE PROBLEM

The preceding history is crucial for understanding the current
deregulated culture within broadcast news. More importantly, it juxtaposes
the current media landscape and demonstrates that it was once possible for
the public to have trust in broadcast news. Whereas big government, labor,
and business have traditionally suffered low public opinion, the public largely
viewed broadcast news in a positive light since its inception, finding
broadcasters trustworthy and credible.123
Part II of this Note examines the current scope of the issue. By first
analyzing the concept of fake news and how that concept impacts public
perception of the media, this Note delves into recent scenarios that meet the
definition of fake news and examines why recent attempts to regulate the
visited Mar. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Code of Integrity].
117
Id.
118
Charter Establishing the CPB Office of the Ombudsman, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING
(Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.cpb.org/ombudsman/charter [hereinafter Charter].
119
Id.
120
See Stuart Soroka et al., Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current Affairs
Knowledge, 43 B. J. POL. S. 1, 4–5 (Oct. 2013).
121
See Susan Banducci, Holli A. Semetko, Media, Mobilization and European Elections,
FIFTH FRAMEWORK RES. PROGRAMME (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/working
papers/media.pdf.
122
See James Curran et. al., Media Systems, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A
Comparative Study, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1, 5–26 (2009),
https://pcl.stanford.edu/research/2008/curran-mediasystems.pdf.
123
Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
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media have failed.
A.

Defining the Problem

This Subpart explains how fake news affects public perception of the
media and how that perception affects public trust of broadcast news. In so
doing, it elucidates a general definition of the term fake news that serves as a
basis from which to evaluate broadcast news stories. A general definition is
necessary to identify stories that fall within the confines of fake news and to
separate those that fall outside those confines.
Examining the pervasiveness of an issue presents a challenge when
no universal definition exists for what constitutes an instance of that issue.
One scholar defined fake news as the “deliberate presentation of [ ] false or
misleading claims as news, where the claims are misleading by design.”124
Yet another study conducted a meta-analysis of 34 academic articles to define
the term.125 The authors of the study recognized that it was clear that fake
news “undermine[s] journalism’s legitimacy . . . .”126 Yet, the phrase fake
news is typically not limited to circumstances in which a journalist
“deliberately” presents false or misleading claims. This term has been
repurposed to describe news that is unflattering or unfair.127 Even so, this is
not to suggest that fake news is a widespread issue within the mainstream
media. Instances of false or misleading broadcast news are rare, but they do
occur.128 These occurrences, however isolated, compound the issue of media
credibility.
Perhaps more concerning is not the proliferation of fake news but the
belief that it is so pervasive.129 Such a belief creates the same net effect: a
distrust of the media. A study conducted by the University of South Carolina
on the perceived effects of fake news found a “positive link between partisan
124

Axel Gelfert, Fake News: A Definition, 38 INFORMAL LOGIC 84, 86 (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v38i1.5068.
125
See generally Edson Tandoc, Jr. & Zheng Lim, Richard Ling, Defining “Fake News” A
Typology of Scholarly Definitions, 6 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 137 (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143 (categorizing fake news into six distinct
subsets: news satire, news parody, news fabrication, photo manipulation, advertising and
public relations, and propaganda).
126
Id. at 147.
127
See David Klein & Joshua Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L.
5, 6–13 (April 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958790.
128
See infra Part II.B.1–3.
129
See S. M. Jang & J. K. Kim, Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News Regulation
and Media Literacy Interventions, 80 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 295 (2018).
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identity and TPP [third-party perception]. In other words, those with greater
identity with their own partisan groups (either Republican or Democrat)
showed greater self-other disparity over the perceived influence of fake
news.”130 Moreover, the study’s authors concluded that the finding “leads to
growing concerns of false consensus among partisan citizens. . . . As partisans
tend to show this perceptual bias regarding the effect of fake news, the role
of information providers, such as news organizations . . . should be
highlighted as an effort of fighting fake news.”131
In many ways, the concept of fake news is not difficult to understand.
Extending beyond the medium of broadcast, when an individual wants an
idea to be accurate, confirmation bias can lead the person to believe the idea
is true. Confirmation bias refers to a psychological phenomenon in which a
person seeks or interprets evidence in a manner that supports existing
beliefs.132 More than seeking information that supports what a person already
believes, people will seek out information that confirms their belief in a
particular way.133 Moreover, people will be less likely to believe factual
accounts that challenge a narrative dissimilar to the beliefs they hold.
Researchers with the Annenberg School of Communication examined
the effects of exposing listeners to one-sided news broadcasts and found that
“[l]isteners who are exposed to more conservative talk evaluate[d] Democrats
more negatively and Republicans more positively. . . .”134 The study sought
to demonstrate the effect of exposure on political attitudes.135 The researchers
determined that as exposure to a message increased, so too did the degree of
agreement with the messenger.136 On the other hand, the researchers tried to
correlate the same finding with listener’s knowledge, a result that a prior
study had posited.137 The researchers concluded that knowledge of a subject
was not as great an indicator as exposure to a one-sided message.138 Put
130
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Id. at 177.
134
Gangheong Lee & Joseph Capella, The Effects of Political Talk Radio on Political
Attitude Formation: Exposure Versus Knowledge, 18 POL. COMM. 369, 378 (2001),
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another way, “when an audience is exposed to an intense, one-sided message,
their agreement with the positions advocated increases as exposure and
reception increase.”139
In the context of fake news, this suggests that a consumer who
continually observes biased news reporting is more likely to increase the
degree of agreement with the conclusions of that report than to seek out other
sources of information that would provide a balanced account of the facts. It
also suggests that reporting that challenges a view already adopted by a
viewer is more likely to be rejected as fake news. This has occurred before,
and the consequences are disconcerting.
B.

Fake News in the Real World

This Subpart analyzes several disreputable instances of fake news that
have rightly contributed to the poor public perception of the media’s
credibility. This Subpart examines an initial story reported by a broadcaster
and discusses the institutional failures that allowed misinformation or
inaccurate reporting to occur.
1.

The Iraq War

Mistakes in reporting are inevitable, but when the news reports only
one side of the story it can create a perception of a reality that does not exist.
Nothing in the subsequent section is meant to suggest that broadcast news
was responsible in whole or in part for the Bush administration’s decision to
invade Iraq. That said, it is worth theorizing how media coverage pre-Iraq
war significantly influenced the public to support the war without evidence.
One study conducted a content analysis of ABC, CBS, and NBC in
the year before the United States’ invasion of Iraq. The study’s authors
identified 1,434 stories from ABC, CBS, and NBC over a period of seven and
a half months before the invasion.140 The study preliminarily suggested that
Americans likely learned and formed much of their initial opinions about the

139
Id. at 389 (finding that Democrats and Independents developed negative attitudes toward
Bill Clinton after listening to conservative talk radio).
140
Danny Hayes & Matt Guardino, Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the
March to the War in Iraq, 27 POL. COMM. 59, 66 (Feb. 3, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1080/
10584600903502615 (The study used six criteria to identify stories for inclusion. Those
criteria were: “(a) primary topical focus, (b) secondary topical focus, (c) identity of each
source, (d) source category, (e) directional thrust of each source’s statement in relation to the
Bush administration’s position of Iraq, and (f) directional thrust of the story as a whole.”).
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Iraq war from broadcast news and were influenced by the coverage.141
The coverage leading up to the invasion from ABC, CBS, and NBC
focused heavily on Iraq’s suspected possession of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).142 At that time, the networks also broadcast stories about
the level of support from the international community and aired segments
about how likely it was the United States would succeed in its efforts against
Iraq.143
Among one of the most frequent criticisms of the broadcast news
coverage of Iraq was its failure to question claims from the Bush
administration about initial assertions that Iraq had WMD.144 Moreover,
commentators suggest that the American public was told why the United
States should invade Iraq, but the counter views were largely shut out. Yet,
from a statistical perspective, the data suggests that counterpoints were
provided adequate coverage.145 Does this suggest that the media provided fair
and balanced coverage of the pre-Iraq war invasion? Perhaps not, because of
who provided the divergent viewpoints.
The scholarly study conducted by Hayes and Guardino examined the
time broadcasters provided for contrasting views but found the issue was not
in the time devoted to opposing views. Rather, it was that those who provided
the opposing views carried the most persuasive tone to the segment.146
For example, George Bush was the source for 53 percent of the quotes
given in favor of the invasion.147 The study found that opposition to the
invasion was largely spoken for on behalf of Iraqi officials: 19 percent of all
quotes were from Saddam Hussein.148 Many of the other voices of opposition
came from foreign leaders who were openly opposed to George Bush.149
Contrast the credibility of Bush at this time to the weight the American public
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gave to those who spoke out against the war.150
The content of coverage coming from ABC, NBC, and CBS at the
time was also a subject of the study. Though the authors found that ABC did
remain largely objective in its coverage, they also determined that CBS and
NBC did not.151 In a review of transcripts during the time before the war,
correspondents on both CBS and NBS portrayed a war with Iraq as inevitable
and necessary.152 The study’s conclusions found that criticisms of network
broadcasts were justified and that the author’s “findings support the view that
media’s performance did not live up to the democratic standards most
journalists hold themselves to, much less those expected by their critics.”153
In the context of fake news, the failure by broadcasters to cover or
provide equal and adequate coverage to opposing sides of the issue ahead of
the U.S. invasion into Iraq contributed to the public distrust of the media.
Broadcasters recognized early in the coverage that the U.S. would invade Iraq
and failed to challenge the government on the rationale behind that decision.
According to Howard Kurtz, a CNN reporter who was among the journalists
that failed to question the Bush administration’s decisions, “[t]he low level
of public confidence in the media has many causes, but one of them stems
from what happened back in 2003.”154
The media’s failure to cover the war objectively in Iraq remains one
of the more notable illustrations of what can occur when a story’s conclusion
is presumed, but it is not the only example.
2.

Seth Rich Conspiracy

At the height of the 2016 presidential election, misinformation about
both candidates was pervasive.155 Yet one fake news story seemed to gain
more traction than others, and the story ultimately led to a lawsuit. Mathew
150
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Ingram of Columbia Journalism Review examined the origins of the Seth
Rich conspiracy story, which alleged that the young Democratic National
Committee staff member killed in a botched robbery was actually
assassinated by a contract killer working for Hillary Clinton.156 The origins
of the conspiracy are difficult to trace, but have largely been attributed to the
Internet Research Agency, a Russian entity that disseminated propaganda in
the U.S. during the 2016 campaign.157 Unlike other stories that were
circulated in 2016, the alleged assassination of Seth Rich grew into a
conspiracy, in part, because it entered mainstream news. A local Fox affiliate
broadcast the story and claimed it had confirmed the details that had
previously only circulated online. The story resulted in a lawsuit.158
Ed Butowsky brought a claim for disparagement and conspiracy
against National Public Radio (NPR) and David Folkenflik.159 The claim also
centered on the local Fox News affiliate—Fox 5 DC.160 Butowsky was an
expert in the financial services industry and made frequent appearances on
television and radio.161 In 2017, Butowsky contacted the family of Seth Rich
and offered to help the family solve their son’s murder; he offered money to
hire a private investigator.162 Later, Butowsky contacted a man named Rod
Wheeler to see if he would be willing to investigate the murder on behalf of
the Rich family.163 In March 2017, Wheeler appeared on the local Fox
affiliate to discuss his theory behind Rich’s death, including his theory that
Rich may have been planning to hand documents about Hillary Clinton over
to Wikileaks.164
Following Wheeler’s appearance on Fox 5, he remained in contact
156
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with a reporter for the broadcast network, at one point alleging in an email:
“I’m ready to say that Seth’s [sic] Death was not a botched robbery and there
appears to be a coverup within the D.C. Gov’t related to his death.”165
According to the court filings, the Fox 5 reporter remembered that Wheeler
was in contact with the Rich family and had expressed interest in exploring
the story.166 On May 15, 2017, Wheeler told a different reporter with Fox 5
that there were various sources within the FBI that had linked Rich to
WikiLeaks: “Absolutely, yeah, and that’s confirmed.”167 The next day, Fox
5 published a story on its website called, “Seth Rich, slain DNC staff, had
contact with Wikileaks, say multiple sources.”168
Within a day, the conspiracy theory became widely publicized and
circulated. The cable news shows Fox & Friends aired two segments based
on the Fox 5 report.169 Despite the story being discredited within hours, Fox
allowed the story to remain published.170 Newt Gingrich, a Fox contributor
on the cable network, spoke on air about the story. Sean Hannity similarly
discussed the story and promoted it on his radio program despite requests
from the family of Seth Rich to cease speaking about their son.171
In the aftermath of the reporting, Wheeler claimed Fox had taken him
out of context and published an incomplete version of what he said.172 More
importantly, the reporters responsible for the misinformation continue to
report at Fox News—one now works as a managing editor for the online
publication.173
Unlike the coverage of the Iraq war, which demonstrated how fake
165
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news can occur in biased or one-sided reporting, the story of Seth Rich
presents a different type of fake news. The reporting on the conspiracy theory
behind Seth Rich’s murder represented disinformation, and more
importantly, disinformation by a foreign government.174
3.

Sinclair Broadcast Group

The preceding Subparts address individual stories that demonstrate
what transpires when the media lacks objectivity or accuracy in reporting.
Those Subparts show the variances in fake news, from biased reporting to
disseminating disinformation. Yet sometimes this issue transcends a singular
broadcast or event. This Subpart addresses the results when the network itself
lacks objectivity in its reporting, affecting all stories the network reports.
In December 2017, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and requested comments on a rule that would affect the maximum national
audience of television broadcast licensees.175 Sinclair Broadcast Group
submitted comments in support of eliminating the national ownership cap.176
Throughout most of the 20th century, regulation would have prevented
Sinclair from reaching its current size; Sinclair Broadcast Group already
owned 200 local television stations in 100 markets.177
Under a prior FCC rule called the “rule of seven,” broadcast stations
were prohibited from owning more than seven AM stations, FM stations, and
TV stations in a single market.178 The rule of seven was adopted in 1953 to
promote diversity among broadcast ownership, but the number increased to

174
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12 stations in 1984 to increase media competition.179 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 further eroded the limitation.180 Even so,
competition and diversity never arose after a relaxation on broadcast
ownership; instead, it led to media monopolies.181
In 2017, Sinclair Broadcast Group required local news anchors on
each of its 193 stations to recite from the same script on air.182 The unusual
nature of the segment extended beyond the words spoken in unison across
193 markets. The segment was peculiar because it was produced to appear
sincere, as though the evening news anchor was sharing his or her earnest
belief about the dangers of fake news. A portion of the segment that aired
stated:
We are extremely proud of the quality, balanced journalism
that [the news station] produces.
....
Unfortunately, some members of the media use their
platforms to push their own personal bias and agenda to
control ‘exactly what people think….’ This is extremely
dangerous to a democracy.183
When the segment aired on individual stations, viewers did not appear to
179

Id.
The Telecommunications Act was signed by Bill Clinton in 1996 intending to create
competition among broadcasters. It was the largest communications bill signed since the
Communications Act of 1934. But the bill never functioned as intended and as a result of the
legislation, corporations could form large monopolies in the media industry. As a result of
the act, ownership of the media decreased from approximately fifty companies controlling
ninety percent of the media to only five companies controlling the same market share. See
Eric Boehlert, One Big Happy Channel?, SALON (June 28, 2011, 11:30 PM),
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sites/default/files/2018-05/Dismantling_Digital_Deregulation.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
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notice the forced script, but the video director at Deadspin weaved together a
video clip that later went viral showing hundreds of anchors across the United
States reading the words in unison.184
Though that incident was the most publicized, Sinclair had required
its broadcasters to air what the network deemed “must-runs” before.185
According to a former newscaster for Sinclair, the segments “were a little
slanted, a little biased. . . .Packages of this nature can make journalists
uncomfortable.”186 Sinclair has required newscasters to include pre-approved
content on stories ranging from terrorism to messages in support of President
Trump.187
But Sinclair’s must-runs include more than just commentary by
newscasters decrying fake news. These short segments are received daily at
television stations across the country, and newsrooms must air the segments
within 24 to 48 hours.188 In one example, during the 2016 campaign, Sinclair
mandated its local news stations air a must-run in which its anchors suggested
voters not vote for Hillary Clinton because the Democratic Party was
historically pro-slavery.189 Current and former reporters for Seattle KOMO
broadcast station have also complained about Sinclair’s programming
requirements and the use of mandated daily polls that the reporter’s described
as asking “leading questions.”190
Yet the allegations against Sinclair predate the 2016 election. In 2004,
Sinclair Broadcast Group declared it would air a documentary on 62 of its
stations weeks before the 2004 presidential campaign that criticized John
Kerry’s record in Vietnam.191 Many of the local stations were in swing states
and were instructed by Sinclair to air the broadcast.192 Kerry’s campaign
184
Fortin & Bromwich, supra note 182; Timothy Burke, How America’s Largest Local TV
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TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/business/media/sinclairbroadcast-komo-conservative-media.html.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Drew Clark, How Fair is Sinclair’s Doctrine? SLATE (Oct. 20, 2004, 4:07 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/10/whatever-happened-to-the-fairness-doctrine.html.
192
Id.

2020

FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS

247

argued that airing the segment would invoke a right to equal time for Kerry
to rebut the accusations made in the documentary.193 Moreover, Sinclair had
instructed stations to preempt regular programming to air the report, which
alleged that testimony by Kerry before Congress contributed to the torture of
soldiers held in Vietnam.194 The allegations were unverified.
Sinclair ultimately backed out of airing the documentary, but Reed
Hundt, the former chair of the FCC, remarked, “If broadcasters start to behave
to the degree [ ] Sinclair is uniquely behaving, the whole industry will find
that they'll be on the short end of the political stick.”195 Sinclair’s behavior
did not improve, however. Thirteen years later, Sinclair has amassed a larger
market share and its behavior has become more brazen.196
C.

Attempts to Reinstate Regulations

Efforts to prevent broadcasters from disseminating biased news or
failing to verify facts before air are challenging because the FCC’s own
guidelines provide that it “cannot interfere with a broadcaster’s selection and
presentation of news or commentary,”197 but for some narrow areas in which
the FCC has the regulatory authority to penalize licensees for knowingly
broadcasting false information.198
The FCC provides a consumer guide that identifies “rigging or
slanting the news” as the “most heinous act against the public interest.”199
Yet despite the complaint process in place, the FCC will not revoke a
broadcaster’s license “unless the extrinsic evidence of possible deliberate
distortion of staging of the news which is brought to our attention, involves
the licensee, including its principals, top management or news
management.”200 But as the instances of broadcast misinformation discussed
193
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supra Part II.B. demonstrate, top management and news management are
often unaware of reporting inaccuracies until after publication, and by then,
it can be difficult to contain a false story. Or, as in the case of Sinclair, the
information broadcast is not misinformation per se, but rather slanted or
biased information that fails to provide consumers a balanced account of
events.
As a result, virtually since the abolishment of the Fairness Doctrine,
legislators have sought to reimpose its regulations in some form on broadcast
media. For example, in 2005, New York Representative Maurice Hinchey
introduced legislation that would reinstate the Doctrine.201 The bill was
deemed the “Hush Rush” bill, in reference to Rush Limbaugh.202 The year
before, Senator Richard Durbin called for the Doctrine to be reinstated.203
Then, when Barack Obama was elected, concern among conservative radio
voices intensified that the Doctrine may actually be reinstated. The Center for
Individual Freedom circulated fundraising alerts with the headline, “Hannity
and Limbaugh to be kicked off the air.”204 Even so, the panic never came to
fruition.
But 2005 was not the first time Congress sought to revive the Fairness
Doctrine. Immediately after the FCC eliminated the Doctrine in 1987,
Congress attempted to codify its principles into law.205 The bill passed the
House and the Senate but President Reagan vetoed it.206 A few years later, as
Rush Limbaugh emerged as a conservative radio host, the bill passed the
House again, but President George Bush threatened to veto the legislation.207
Similar attempts to revive the legislation did not emerge until 1993
with the hope that a democratic president, Bill Clinton, would usher in the
regulations.208 By that time, Limbaugh had portrayed the bill as an “attempt
by the United States Congress to legislate against [him] and talk radio
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201
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hosts.”209 Not only did Bill Clinton never revive the Fairness Doctrine, but
he passed the Telecommunications Act, further deregulating the broadcast
industry.210
III.

INDEPENDENT BROADCAST COUNCIL

Though regulating broadcasters presents challenges, the current
deregulated atmosphere weighs against allowing broadcast to exist in
perpetuity without additional oversight. To combat fake news and restore the
perception of public trust to the media, this Note proposes creating an
Independent Broadcast Council (Council) to administer and monitor
broadcast regulation, including a revised version of the Fairness Doctrine.
Stated simply, the Council would operate under the guidance of the
FCC as a voluntarily regulatory oversight committee in much the same
format and function that the American Bar Association operates in its
oversight of lawyers. That said, unlike the FCC, as an independent body, this
Council would operate without political pressure to monitor broadcasters for
compliance with revised regulations that seek to ensure fair and balanced
coverage.
This Part proposes that the Council would be structured under the
framework of existing legislation that established the Public Broadcasting
Act. The Council would operate under a charter adopted to implement the
key tenets of the Fairness Doctrine. By incorporating both aspects of this
proposal, this Note argues that revised broadcast regulations would be less
susceptible to partisan influence and would increase public perception of the
media, while its independent and voluntary nature would ensure that it
remained within the confines of the First Amendment.
Media regulation can occur in essentially one of two forms: selfregulation or government regulation.211 This concept is, itself, somewhat
misleading. There are various forms of regulation possible from complete
state control to “consensus regulation.”212 Yet, unlike countries that have
209
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proposed or implemented sweeping media regulations, United States citizens
are protected under the First Amendment, limiting government intrusions on
freedom of the press.213 Even so, a hybrid alternative may be possible.
Enforced self-regulation of broadcast news would bring together a regulatory
body of stakeholders; the government’s role would be to ensure enforcement
of the self-imposed regulations under the FCC.214
A.

The Proposal

This Subpart examines how reimplementing broadcast regulation
should be administered, how the Fairness Doctrine should be updated, and
how the United States can replicate the successful efforts of other countries
in creating an independent agency to oversee broadcast news. Along the way,
this Subpart elucidates the potential design that can keep broadcast regulation
within the purview of the First Amendment while upholding the role of
broadcasters as public trustees that was once envisioned under the Fairness
Doctrine.
1.

Creating a Broadcast Council: The Framework

The framework for an Independent Broadcast Council already exists
under the legislation for the Public Broadcasting Act.215 Even so, the current
Act encompasses solely public broadcasters. But it is, by itself, the product
of nearly a century of congressional amendments and legislative change.216
Given the congressional propensity to amend and expand this legislation, the
Public Broadcasting Act can similarly be amended to expand the scope of the
existing framework to encompass commercial broadcasters.
Despite the flaws, the Public Broadcasting Act serves as a significant
213
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first step in the effort to remedy the faults in America’s broadcast and its
framework can be revised to incorporate the vision of restoring credibility to
broadcast news. There are significant advantages to working within an
existing piece of legislation rather than trying to create the Council under an
entirely new regulatory scheme. First, the Public Broadcasting Act was
passed in 1967.217 Second, in the more than 50 years since its passage, public
broadcasters have adhered to the statutory mandate of “strict adherence to
objectivity and balance” resulting in a high public trust of public television.218
Third, if the United States were to codify aspects of the Fairness Doctrine in
this legislation and expand the standards that organizations such as PBS and
NPR voluntarily follow under the Act, the United States could implement the
successful aspects of the Public Broadcasting Act while remaining within the
confines of the First Amendment.
2.

The Structure

Borrowing from both concepts of international broadcast regulatory
authority and existing attempts in the United States to establish public
broadcasting, the process of creating an Independent Broadcast Council
would begin through legislation. An amendment to the Public Broadcasting
Act could largely achieve these goals.
In its current form, the Public Broadcasting Act states, in part: “it
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services
which will be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities
and throughout the United States, will constitute an expression of diversity
and excellence. . . .”219 The governing body of the Corporation created under
the Act consists of a Board of Directors, and the “term of each office of each
member of the Board appointed by the President shall be 6 years. . . .”220 After
presidential appointment, each member of the CPB must undergo Senate
confirmation.221 Moreover, the Public Broadcasting Act established a
Treasury fund that appropriated financial support for public broadcasting.222
This structure presents both the potential to rectify some concerns and
some immediate flaws. First, the political appointment process of board
217
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members to the CPB creates the opportunity for partisan influence. By
permitting presidential appointments, the organization is vulnerable to
leadership that is sympathetic to partisan policy views. This potential would
be magnified if the Corporation were expanded.223 On the other hand, public
broadcasting is intended to serve the public interest. In many ways CPB has
met this lofty ambition; for the 16th consecutive year, Americans rated PBS
as the most trusted institution, above the court and legal system.224
American’s perception of trust in public broadcasting is significantly higher
than that of traditional broadcast,225 but to expand the Act, changes will have
to occur.
As such, the existing Public Broadcasting Act would function as both
a springboard for amended legislation and an opportunity to improve
legislation. Regardless of the specifics adopted, the broad features of any
regulatory scheme imposed under the Council would include: (1) an
organizational structure for the Council, (2) a funding mechanism, (3)
mechanisms for implementing and enforcing decisions, (4) and
accountability measures.226
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How to Amend the Act

This Subpart will first describe the process of amending the Public
Broadcasting Act and then elucidate the reason for these steps.
The process to amend the Public Broadcasting Act would work as
follows: A bill would propose the amendment to the existing Public
Broadcasting Act. Because the intended purpose of revised legislation would
be to amend existing law, the proposed bill would clearly articulate its
relation to the preexisting Public Broadcasting Act.227 To amend a law, a
proposed bill may add, strike, or add and strike new text.228 The purpose of
an amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act would likely be to both add
and strike new text from the existing legislation.229 In so doing, the
amendatory bill would identify the specific alterations in the existing law that
it will modify.230
Following the amended version of the bill, a comparative print
between the revised version and the Public Broadcasting Act would be
provided.231 According to House Rule XIII, clause 3(e)(1) (the Ramseyer
Rule) and Senate Rule XXVI (the Cordon Rule), when a bill is reported out
of committee that amends existing law, the committee must provide a
comparative print that demonstrates how the amendment modifies existing
law.232
Next, the amended legislation would revise the corporate structure
under the existing Public Broadcasting Act to eliminate the process of
political appointees. The political appointment of board members serves to
undermine public trust in the media rather than bolster it. Whether intentional
or inadvertent, appointing political figures to the board who are subsequently
responsible for programming decisions, can impact how news is covered and
impact the objectivity of reporters.
Instead, in the same manner that the existing Public Broadcasting Act
established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting as a nonprofit entity, the
board of directors under the Independent Broadcast Council should be
227
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selected from stakeholders within broadcasting and confirmed by peers. This
process would mirror the method by which the Act currently mandates only
two members be selected: “[o]ne member shall be selected from among
individuals who represent the licensees and permittees of public television
stations, and one member shall be selected from among individuals who
represent the licensees and permittees of public radio stations.”233
The benefit to this change is two-fold. First, it eliminates the political
appointment process. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it creates a
vested interest in the success of the Council for stakeholders. Moreover,
amended legislation would call for a board seat filled by a member of the
public; a member that is selected from within the board to serve on a rotating
basis that provides insight into the communities the media is meant to serve.
With the corporate structure addressed, the amended Public
Broadcasting Act would next add language from the Fairness Doctrine. This
language would largely need to be revised to address First Amendment
trepidations.
For example, the Public Broadcasting Act currently states, “it is in the
public interest to encourage the growth and development of public radio and
television broadcasting, including the use of such media for instructional,
educational, and cultural purposes. . . .”234 Amended legislation could be
revised to include language that the broadcaster must make every effort to
present contrasting views and inform the general public.235 Similarly,
whereas the current legislation mandates that public broadcasting “furthers
the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which
will be responsive to the interests of people[,]” revised legislation may
suggest that in so doing, licensees devote a reasonable portion of the
broadcast to the discussion of issues of public importance.236 Lastly, current
legislation mandates that public television “encourage the development of
programming . . . and that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved
audiences . . .”237 but revised legislation could expand this mandate to meet
these goals for all audiences in an objective and transparent manner.238 This
233
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serves two goals. First, it codifies the Fairness Doctrine, which, as the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals determined in TRAC v. FCC, had never occurred.239
Second, it resolves the constitutionally suspect language that led the FCC to
abandon the doctrine in the 1980s.240
Subpart D, subsection (a) of the Public Broadcasting Act identifies
ten congressional declarations of policy, including the establishment of the
private Corporation.241 Revised legislation would create the entity known as
the “Independent Broadcast Council,” replacing the existing Corporation for
Public Broadcasting. The need to create a new entity under the Act arises
under the nature of the revised legislation; the revised Act would greatly
expand the purpose of the Public Broadcasting Act to encompass all
broadcast media, not just public telecommunications. Revising the entity
would clarify the role and the purpose of the Council and contrast it from the
existing Corporation. Even so, nothing in the revised legislation should be
interpreted to suggest that participation is mandated. The Council would
function as a voluntary self-regulatory body.
The organization would operate independent of, but in cooperation
with, the FCC.242 The Council would also operate under a charter and code
of ethics. Coordination between the Council and the FCC in the United States
would be crucial.243 Most importantly, involving key media stakeholders in
the Council significantly diminishes the likelihood of challenges to the
regulatory framework.
Such a proposed charter and code of integrity is not dissimilar to the
current manner in which the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
functions.244 Yet the existing charter and code of integrity is largely targeted
meant to suggest that the Note proposes adopting precise language to replace existing
statutory language.
239
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240
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toward public and educational broadcasting and would need to be revised to
address the wider scope of the Act. As such, the standards of conduct and
code of integrity implemented under the Independent Broadcast Council
should be developed by the members of the Council and could be based on
the existing codes. Nevertheless, the revised standards should, at a minimum,
contain a commitment to fairness and accuracy in reporting.245 Once created,
the Council would use the standards of conduct and code of integrity to create
a rating system.
4.

Rating System

The revised Public Broadcasting Act would call for a new rating
system of broadcast news to help viewers assess the creditability of the
coverage. The existing television rating system was put into place by
Congress with the passage of the Telecommunications Act to allow parents
to block objectionable content from children.246 This same concept and
technology can be used objectively to assess the credibility of news coverage.
The rating system would assign a numerical value to broadcast news
stations and rate the station on a quarterly or semi-quarterly basis. The
metrics for the rating could be based upon credibility, trustworthiness,
objectivity, and the variety of stories covered. Though the individual
components to the rating system would vary, it would likely be crucial to
have a multi-factor rating system so as to not cause significant fluctuations in
a station’s rating from one quarter to the next, but rather an objective metric
that considered multiple factors. Moreover, much like the program content
warning system that airs before a television program, this proposed system
could warn viewers about news content with a history of providing unverified
claims.
Ethics and Business Conduct for Employees of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
CPB (April 21, 2010), https://www.cpb.org/files/board/governance/Governance_Policies_
(Code_of_Ethics_for_employees).pdf; Code of Ethics for Directors of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, CPB (May 1, 2006) https://www.cpb.org/files/board/governance/
Governance_Policies_(Code_of_Ethics_and_Conflicts_Policy_for_Board).pdf; Roles and
Responsibilities of the Board of Directors, Chair of the Board, and President in Directing the
Affairs of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, CPB (May 1, 2006),
https://www.cpb.org/files/board/governance/Governance_Policies_(Roles_of_Board,_Chai
r,_CEO).pdf.
245
See Finkelstein, supra note 211.
246
Amy Nathanson & Joanne Cantor, Protecting Children from Harmful Television: TV
Ratings and the V-Chip, PARENTHOOD AM. (1998), https://parenthood.library.wisc.edu/
Nathanson/Nathanson.html.
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A rating system solves two problems. First, it remedies the issue of
mandating broadcasters to participate in the Independent Broadcast Council.
It does so because participation in the Council would be voluntary, but by
electing not to follow the standards and code of ethics adopted under the
Council, broadcasters would see a decline in the numerical value assigned
through the rating system. Second, the rating system remedies the issue of
rendering the Council ineffective through voluntary participation.
Functioning under the same mechanism that the existing television rating
system allows, a credibility rating system is merely one proposed regulation
to combat fake news.
B.

How Regulations Combat Fake News

Having clarified how the Council would be created and structured,
this Subpart addresses how such a Council would work to combat fake news.
Specifically, this Subpart shows how regulation would begin to restore
credibility to the media.
1.

Defining the Problem

There is no clear definition of the phrase fake news. As analyzed
supra Part II, this contributes, in part, to the extent of the problem. Depending
on the source, the definition ranges from information that is clearly false to
information that is sensationalized. According to one dictionary, the term is
defined as “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise
of news reporting.”247 The term was popularized in 2016 when thenpresidential candidate Donald Trump began to use the term, but while Trump
may have popularized the phrase, the concept existed long before he brought
it into the mainstream.248
By the end of the 2016 election cycle, when important stories began
to percolate to the top of the news cycle regarding Russian interference in the
campaign, a large swath of Americans had become largely disconnected from
the news, finding it too polarizing.249 Even more were beginning to accept
247

Fake News, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/
dictionary/english/fake-news (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
248
Tom Standage, The True History of Fake News, ECONOMIST (June 2017),
https://www.1843magazine.com/technology/rewind/the-true-history-of-fake-news.
249
See Lee Raine, Scott Keeter & Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES.
CTR. (July 22, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-inamerica/.
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Trump’s characterization that the news was “fake.”250 President Trump has a
propensity for using the term fake news to describe stories he finds
unfavorable, but for his supporters, the term invokes feelings of media bias
and unfairness.251
Nevertheless, like Trump, what many people describe as fake news is
merely less objective news or news with which they do not agree.252 What
results from the latter is a cycle of seeking out information that confirms
preexisting beliefs. “One of the biggest risks often imputed to the current
media environment, in which audiences can pick and choose news outlets that
agree with them, is that people will become more and more siloed, cutting
themselves off from information that they don’t like or that contradicts their
prior assumptions.”253
More than 53 percent of respondents to a Pew study placed the blame
for fake news squarely on the media.254 Even so, had the media been more
regulated from the beginning, and the coverage been more balanced, perhaps
consumers would have been more receptive to the coverage. Pew Research
found that six in ten Democrats have dropped a media outlet over the
perception that the outlet was covering fake news; up to 70 percent of
Republicans have done the same.255
Implementing the Independent Broadcast Council could define fake
news and take proactive steps to address it, much like the French did ahead

250

See Tim Alberta, The Deep Roots of Trump’s War on the Press, POLITICO (April 26,
2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/26/the-deep-roots-trumps-waron-the-press-218105 (describing the point in 2016 at which hatred of the media reached new
heights and the concept that the media was the “enemy of the people” began to occur).
251
Daniel Bush, When Trump Says ‘Fake News,’ This is What Supporters Say They Hear,
PBS (Oct. 31, 2018, 10:31 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/when-trump-saysfake-news-this-is-what-supporters-say-they-hear (noting that when supporters were asked
after a Trump rally what they believed the term “fake news” meant after President Trump
had called the media “fake” and “enemy of the people” the concept of fairness and balance
was a repeated theme).
252
Id.
253
David Graham, Some Real News About Fake News, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2019)
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/fake-news-republicans-democrats/
591211/.
254
Id.
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Amy Mitchel & Jeffrey Gottfried, et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up News is a Critical
Problem that Needs to be Fixed, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/
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of election interference in the French elections in November 2018.256
Identifying the problem is the first step to addressing it; without a unified
definition from which broadcasters can work to identify what fake news is,
there is little to suggest that broadcasters can remedy the issue.257
An Independent Broadcast Council cannot provide fair and objective
reporting if no standard exists by which to measure objective reporting. The
concept is quite nebulous. If this Council is to succeed, it can only do so under
clear guidelines. Thus, though the phrase fake news is often used in scholarly
articles to imply an intent to deceive or misinform,258 this Note uses the term
to mean bias or unfair reporting, though such a definition would not preclude
an intent to deceive. The reason for a broader definition is that any attempt to
restore public trust of the media cannot begin by putting a standard in place
that does not address the public’s concern.
In fact, the disparity in the definition of fake news may contribute to
the misinformation over how prolific the issue truly is. While some use the
term to refer to inaccurate stories, others use the phrase to refer to unfavorable
stories.259 Lack of uniformity in the definition contributes to misinformation
and perpetuates the cycle.
2.

Creating a Process to Fix the Problem

The Independent Broadcast Council could operate to manage
complaints and oversee the objectivity of broadcasters under its purview.
Such a process could operate as follows: A complaint or observation of
inaccurate or biased reporting is brought to the attention of the Council.260
The Council would then notify the station of the complaint in an attempt to
resolve the complaint. If the offending station were to refuse to remedy the
error, the Council would have the authority to notify the FCC which could
result in a decrease to the station’s credibility rating. On the other hand,
256

Alexander Ricci, French Opposition Parties Are Taking Macron’s Anti-Information Law
to Court. POYNTER (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/frenchopposition-parties-are-taking-macrons-anti-misinformation-law-to-court/.
257
See THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROBLEM SOLVING 1–4 (Janet Davidson & Robert Sternberg
eds. 2003) (describing problem solving as a cycle where the first step begins with recognizing
and Identifying the problem).
258
See generally Gelfert, supra note 124; Klein & Wueller, supra note 127; Tandoc, supra
note 125.
259
Graham, supra note 253 (noting that when Trump supporters use the phrase “fake news,”
they are typically referring to news they dislike while others are referring to misinformation).
260
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should the station abide by the Council’s recommendation to remedy the
issue, the station would be provided one of several choices to revise the story.
For example, if the allegation involved bias, the station could remedy the
issue by providing equal airtime to the issue on the opposing side.
Conversely, if the complaint involved an allegation of misinformation, the
station could air a correction.
The primary benefit to the Council is that it establishes a dialogue
between broadcasters and presents an opportunity for the station to refuse the
recommendation of the Council but creates consequences for doing so,
namely a negative consequence to the credibility rating of the station. Though
the First Amendment would prohibit the agency from censoring a broadcast
station, regulations could be adapted to fine the station, or to provide
warnings to viewers that the information was unverified. More importantly,
creating a unified definition and standard under which broadcasters operate
would provide the public with a standard against which to hold the media
accountable and likely aid in restoring public trust.
C.

Potential Applications for an Independent Broadcast Council

Having established how the Independent Broadcast Council would
function, this Subpart identifies how the Council would operate in a
regulatory environment. Specifically, this Subpart shows how this Council
would enable the media to regain credibility from the American public and
combat allegations of fake news.
The advantage to creating an Independent Broadcast Council under
the umbrella of the FCC is that such co-regulation provides sufficient
independence from the government, as is the case with the existing Public
Broadcasting Act, while still providing regulatory oversight. Such enforced
self-regulation retains the benefits of self-regulation while ensuring an
effective operation of the system.261 Establishing an independent regulatory
body would not only improve journalistic standards, but it would also
increase transparency and provide the public with a mechanism through
which to voice concerns about inaccurate and biased reporting. This proposal
would also increase accountability. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
previously demonstrated its openness to a variation of such regulation.262
To illustrate, consider how the Independent Broadcast Council would
261
262

See Finkelstein, supra note 211, at 297.
See infra Part III.D.
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have functioned in the examples discussed supra Part II.
1.

The Iraq War—Revisited

First, given the process elucidated supra Part III.B.2, it is worth
analyzing how the scheme would have functioned on coverage leading up to
the Iraq war. The coverage analyzed supra was for a period of seven and a
half months. Imagine a complaint was filed during that period. Alternatively,
the Council itself could have observed inaccurate or biased reporting.
Consider the process had a complaint been filed relating to the amount of
airtime then-president George Bush received in support of the view that Iraq
had WMD as opposed to the amount and quality of time the commentators
received who spoke out against that view.
Under the process identified, the next step would be for the Council
to reach out to the station. For the coverage of Iraq, those stations were NBC,
CBS, and ABC.263 Once the Council notified the station of the complaint, the
station would have the opportunity to resolve the issue. Here, that would
result in either providing more credible commentators to speak in opposition
to the theory that Iraq had WMD (recall the primary opposition voice at the
time was Suddam Hussein) or to provide an analysis of the opposing
viewpoint from network commentators.
The concept is not radical. Opposing viewpoints existed at the time
from credible sources. Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy spoke in
September 2002, stating, “[i]nformation from the intelligence community
over the past six months does not point to Iraq as an imminent threat to the
United States or a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.”264 The
Chief United Nations weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said in 2003, “[t]he
commission has not at any time during the inspection in Iraq found evidence
of the continuation or resumption of programs of weapons of mass
destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items, whether from pre1991 or later.”265
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Hayes & Guardino, supra note 140.
Eric Alterman & George Zornick, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Did “Everyone”
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The purpose of the Independent Broadcast Council in a situation such
as the one described above is not to suggest that had it existed, the United
States would not have relied on false intelligence. Rather, it is to suggest that
it could have created a dialogue between broadcasters and the public sooner
or shined a light on what was occurring. Years later, as the full extent of the
media operation to sway public opinion in favor of a war became clear,
journalists who unknowingly participated expressed regret. Kenneth Allard,
a former NBC military analyst recalled, “I felt we’d been hosed.”266
“Internal Pentagon documents repeatedly refer[ed] to the military
analysts [who the networks booked as commentators] as ‘message force
multipliers’ or ‘surrogates’ who could be counted on to deliver administration
‘themes and messages’ to millions of Americans ‘in the form of their own
opinions.’”267 It is difficult to hypothesize whether an Independent Broadcast
Council could have remedied the mass media failure that contributed to the
disinformation of the Iraq war, but it would have acted as a final arbiter
between broadcasters and the public and could have aided in providing a
more balanced approach to the coverage. More importantly, it could have
provided the public the opportunity to weigh both sides of the issue for and
against military action—an opportunity the public was denied.
2.

Seth Rich—Revisited

Second, the conspiracy that arose from Seth Rich’s murder presents
another example for how an Independent Broadcast Council would function,
yet it does so in a drastically divergent manner than the preceding scenario.
Here, when Fox 5 published the story, the credibility of it was not
immediately clear.268 The environment in place at the broadcasting network
when this story aired was not conducive to preventing the publication of
disinformation. According to the complaint filed after the broadcast:
“Revelations about Fox News' role in concocting a baseless story on the death
of a young Democratic staffer has problematic echoes for the network’s
controlling owner . . .”269 This type of disinformation spreads quickly, as
evidenced by the speed at which the Seth Rich story circulated after its
266

David Barstow, Behind TV Analysists, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES (April 20,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html.
267
Id.
268
See generally Butowsky v. Folkenflik, 4:18CV442, 2019 WL 2518833, at *3–*5 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 17, 2019).
269
Id. at *10.
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publication on Fox 5.270
Under the framework identified before, in a case of disinformation
the Independent Broadcast Council could have reached out to Fox 5 that day
and requested a retraction. If Fox 5 refused, the Council would have
alternatives available that may have limited the reach of the story and the
impact on the Rich family.
First, other member organizations of the Council could have clarified
the story.271 It is worth noting that this may not be an ideal solution to slow
the spread of disinformation, however. An effort to clarify a false story by
other networks could inadvertently bring more attention to the story, thus
increasing the speed with which it circulates. Alternatively, the Council could
notify the FCC. Under the proposed rating system, the FCC would have the
ability to reduce the station’s rating, signaling to viewers that the station’s
credibility is diminished. For the station to improve its rating, it would have
to demonstrate to the Council that it had published a retraction of the story
and that a period of time had elapsed without similar untruthful reporting.
Of note, had standards been in place, adopted under a charter of ethics
and code of conduct that members of the Council agreed to abide by,
including individual broadcast stations, it may have prevented this
journalistic malpractice from occurring. Even so, assuming arguendo that the
existence of a Council could not have prevented the publication of this story,
it may have limited its impact.
It is also worth noting that, though the process identified here would
require the Council to notify the FCC of proposed violations of the charter,
this does not negate the need or value of the Council as an oversight body.
The FCC has jurisdiction over all interstate and international communications
by radio, television, cable, and satellite.272 As such, the FCC cannot manage
the content on individual local stations, but an Independent Council, centered
in the individual communities it served, likely could.
270

See id. at *4 (the following day the story was aired by Sean Hannity, and Wheeler later
appeared on Fox Business with Lou Dobbs to discuss the investigation).
271
This Note does not propose that a Broadcast Council would force the network to remove
the story, even if it was a demonstrated falsity because of First Amendment protections.
Rather, the purpose of the Broadcast Council in relation to improving public perception of
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Sinclair Broadcast Group—Revisited

Finally, the circumstances involving Sinclair Broadcast Group
present yet another hypothetical by which to examine the effectiveness of an
Independent Broadcast Council. Unlike both of the stories addressed supra,
Sinclair is demonstrable of a network that has shifted its reporting style away
from objectivity, rather than a single story or group of stories that lack
objectivity. Even so, such a circumstance can be illustrative for how the
Council would operate. Imagine that, given the size of Sinclair Broadcast
Group and its significant influence, it elected not to participate in the
Independent Broadcast Council. In several ways, such a decision would not
significantly diminish the effect of the proposed Council.
First, because the proposed Council operates under the FCC, it would
assume much of the regulatory oversight of the FCC. Second, despite the size
of Sinclair, it still operates at a market share of roughly 39 percent.273 This is
because, under the FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, a station group cannot
reach more than 39 percent of all U.S. households.274 As such, other station
groups would comprise the remaining 61 percent of the market.275
This is relevant to the effectiveness of the Council for several
reasons. Once implemented, stations that elect not to participate in the
Council would have a lower credibility rating than those that voluntarily
participate. This would stem from oversight and cooperation with the Council
and adherence to standards to provide credible and accurate reporting.
Though the Council cannot mandate participation, the net effect is a warning
to consumers that the information they receive from a network that elects not
to participate in the Council has not been verified or authenticated.
Though Sinclair Broadcast Group could elect not to participate in the
Council or abide by the standards the Council adopts, the purpose of the
Council would remain intact. The objective of the Council’s framework is to
provide the public a unified standard against which to measure the objectivity
and credibility of broadcast news. Above all else, because the proposed
273

Alvin Chang, Sinclair’s Takover of Local News, In One Striking Map, VOX (Apr. 6, 2018,
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standards largely function within existing law, the courts would likely uphold
the standards as constitutional.
D.

Reconciling the Law

Commentators opposed to reinstating regulation on broadcasters,
particularly a reiteration of the Fairness Doctrine, maintain that the regulation
had a chilling effect on the First Amendment.276 The FCC itself raised this
concern in its 1985 Fairness Report.277 For several reasons, this argument
does not stand as an immobile obstacle to re-implementing any reiteration of
the Fairness Doctrine on broadcasters. First, in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Fairness
Doctrine.278 The Court held that free speech was “the right of the viewers and
the listeners, not the right of the broadcasters.”279 Second, the Doctrine never
mandated what broadcaster covered. Instead, it required broadcasters to
provide balanced coverage of controversial issues. Moreover, the Supreme
Court differentiated broadcast on the basis of its licensing requirements;
because the FCC licensed broadcasters, the Court determined it did not
present a First Amendment issue:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as
proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable
time and attention to matters of great public concern. To
condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness
to present representative community views on controversial
issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those
constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.280
276

Karen Beth Gray, Fairness Doctrine Termination: Extinction of an Unenforceable
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This nuance is often overlooked, but it is an important facet of the original
Fairness Doctrine that speaks to the constitutionality of the legislation. Even
so, following the Red Lion decision, discussed supra Part I, several appellate
court cases challenged the doctrine on First Amendment grounds.281
It is likely that if the Doctrine were resurrected in its prior form,
opponents to the legislation would immediately mount a court challenge. In
part, this would be justified. The Doctrine was drafted by the FCC in 1949,
barely a decade after the FCC itself emerged.282 Television broadcast was in
its infancy and not much was understood about the concept of the radio
spectrum.283 As such, the rationale behind reinstating a version of the
Fairness Doctrine today is not supported by the scarcity rationale that the
Supreme Court used to justify upholding the Doctrine in 1969; instead, the
rationale is supported by a recognition that the Fairness Doctrine helped
preserve civility in broadcast journalism and created an ethical standard for
the public to hold broadcasters to. It would be this standard—the concept that
broadcasters were intended to serve as public trustees—coupled with the
voluntary nature of the Independent Broadcast Counsel, which would likely
withstand revised regulations.
In a broader context, even considering the extensive proposal made,
it is unlikely that an Independent Broadcast Council would run afoul of the
First Amendment. Rather, the Supreme Court would likely uphold such
legislation. Consider FCC v. League of Women Voters of California in which
the Supreme Court examined the First Amendment implications of the Public
Broadcasting Act.284
In its original iteration, section 399 of the Act prohibited
editorializing on public broadcasting stations.285 In asserting this argument
before the Court, the government maintained that such a ban on public
broadcasting networks was necessary to protect educational broadcasting
from coercion from becoming the target of government propaganda as a
result of federal financing.286 Unlike the Court’s decision in Red Lion which
upheld editorializing, section 399 prohibited broadcasters from addressing
281
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issues of public importance, irrespective of whether it was done in a fair and
balanced way.287
The Court determined that section 399’s ban on editorializing
exceeded what was necessary to protect public broadcasting from coercion
by government influence.288 The government also argued that section 399
prevented public broadcasting stations from becoming “a privileged outlet
for the political and ideological opinions of station owners and managers . . .
.”289 Even so, the Court was unconvinced. The Court invoked the
requirements of the Fairness Doctrine as a regulatory mechanism to ensure
that public broadcast would remain fair and balanced, reasoning:
[T]he public's interest in preventing public broadcasting
stations from becoming forums for lopsided presentations of
narrow partisan positions is already secured by a variety of
other regulatory means that intrude far less drastically upon
the journalistic freedom of noncommercial broadcasters. The
requirements of the FCC's fairness doctrine, for instance,
which apply to commercial and noncommercial stations alike,
ensure that such editorializing would maintain a reasonably
balanced and fair presentation of controversial issues.290
Moreover, the Court reasoned that its holding in Red Lion contemplated the
same justification argued by the government:
The solution to this problem offered by § 399, however, is
precisely the opposite of the remedy prescribed by the FCC
and endorsed by the Court in Red Lion. Rather than requiring
noncommercial broadcasters who express editorial opinions
on controversial subjects to permit more speech on such
subjects to ensure that the public's First Amendment interest
in receiving a balanced account of the issue is met, § 399
simply silences all editorial speech by such broadcasters.
Since the breadth of § 399 extends so far beyond what is
necessary to accomplish the goals identified by the
Government, it fails to satisfy the First Amendment standards
287
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289
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290
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that we have applied in this area.291
The Court held that there was no reason to deny public broadcasters the right
to speak on issues of public concern.292 Unfortunately, the principle of the
Fairness Doctrine that the Court assumed would protect public broadcasting
was abandoned by the FCC within five years of the ruling in League of
Women Voters.293
The holding of this case is important for several reasons, but namely
because of the Court’s treatment of Red Lion. League of Women Voters came
before the Court 15 years after Red Lion. The Court had the opportunity to
distinguish public broadcasting from commercial broadcasting or to separate
the principles of the Fairness Doctrine from broadcasters that receive public
funding, but it elected not to do so, instead embracing the Doctrine as a
“guard against one-sided presentation of controversial issues . . . .”294 In so
doing, the Court demonstrated that it is possible, if not likely, that the Public
Broadcasting Act could be amended to encompass not only the guiding
principles of the Fairness Doctrine, but also broadened to include commercial
broadcasters, having found that the same regulations apply equally to both.
Along similar lines, consider the more recent case of Serafyn v.
295
FCC. This case is of particular interest because it originates out of the D.C.
Circuit—the court that was instrumental in providing the FCC its rationale in
abandoning the Fairness Doctrine.296 In Serafyn, the petitioner requested the
FCC deny CBS a license renewal after the station aired a news segment that
the petitioner alleged “intentionally distorted the situation in Ukraine by
claiming that most Ukrainians are anti-Semitic.”297 In recounting the policy
outlined by the FCC during the 1960s, the court quoted the FCC as stating:
“[I]f the allegations of staging. . . simply involve news employees of the
station, we will, in appropriate cases. . . inquire into the matter, but unless our
investigation reveals involvement of the licensee or its management there will
be no hazard to the station's licensed status. . . .”298
The segment at issue in Serafyn involved a piece called “The Ugly
291

Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
293
See supra Part I.B.
294
League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. at 372.
295
See Serafyn, 149 F.3d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
296
See supra Part I.
297
Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1216.
298
Id. at 1217 (quoting Hunger in America, 20 FCC 2d 143, 150, 151 (1969)).
292

2020

FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS

269

Face of Freedom,” that aired on 60 Minutes. The broadcast suggested that
Ukraine had a negative view toward Jews.299 After the broadcast, CBS
received letters from Ukrainian-Americans expressing their anger over the
broadcast, including one which suggested it was “unbalanced” and “did not
convey the true state of affairs in Ukraine.”300 CBS argued that it would not
investigate because any such investigation would “offend[] the protections of
a free press.” As a result, the FCC determined that the incident did “not satisfy
the standard for demonstrating intent to distort,” and that the petitioner had
failed to demonstrate that CBS did not meet its public interest obligation.301
Before the court of appeals, the petitioner argued that:
[T]he Commission has never articulated a precise definition
of extrinsic evidence and that its prior decisions suggest it is
merely seeking objective evidence from outside the broadcast
which demonstrates, without any need for the Commission to
second-guess a licensee’s journalistic judgement or for the
Commission to make credibility findings, that the licensee has
distorted a news program.302
The court determined that the FCC made several errors that contravened its
own policy, including that it required the petitioner to demonstrate evidence
that CBS had engaged in a pattern of distortion, despite its policy requiring a
complainant meet a lower threshold.303 The court raised particular concern
with the evidence of factual inaccuracies raised by the petitioner and
disregarded by the FCC.304 The petitioner argued that CBS misrepresented
facts to the extent that its decision to broadcast portions of the segment
suggests it intentionally distorted the news.305 The court concluded that the
FCC acted arbitrarily in denying the petitioner’s request to revoke CBS’s
license, but did determine that CBS had not made a material
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misrepresentation to the FCC.
Yet this case shows not only the benefit of having an Independent
Broadcast Council but also the court’s willingness to accept the oversight.
The court’s concern here was centered on the FCC’s failure to oversee CBS,
despite CBS’s claim that such oversight would impede its First Amendment
protections. Moreover, though the FCC possessed the regulatory power to
revoke CBS’s license following these complaints, it simply elected not to. An
Independent Council could more consistently work with the complaints of
the public to increase oversight over broadcasters and manage these exact
issues.
E.

Successful Regulatory Schemes in Europe

Those who oppose the reinstatement of regulations on the media
maintain that it infringes on First Amendment protections and the freedom of
the press.306 Yet some of the most stringent regulations on the media exist in
European countries that protect the freedom of the press. Even so, legislation
to regulate fake news in Europe has rightly garnered concerns from the world
press and human rights activists concerning free speech and press
freedoms.307 European countries are cognizant of balancing a citizen’s right
to be informed with a citizen’s right to be accurately informed. Following a
wave of nationalist elections and referendums in which disinformation played
a large role, Europe is looking for a balance between free speech and
objective reporting.308
Perhaps no greater contrast exists against the backdrop of the 2016
presidential election in which disinformation was so prevalent than in France
where similar efforts failed. Following the United States’ 2016 presidential
election that Russia successfully infiltrated, then-French presidential
candidate Emmanuel Macron became the target of Russian disinformation.
However, unlike the United States, the structure of French media made it less
susceptible to Russian inference. Like presidential candidate Hillary Clinton,
306
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Russia targeted Macron’s emails ahead of the French election and intended
for a mass release.309 For two reasons, the emails did not gain traction in
France in the same manner the release of Clinton’s emails gained national
attention in the United States. First, French electoral laws prohibit media
outlets from news coverage of political candidates for forty-four hours ahead
of the election.310 Second, the media voluntarily abided by a request from the
Macron campaign team the night the emails were hacked not to report on the
content of the emails.311 Moreover, some traditional broadcasters denounced
the Russian efforts and called upon their viewers not to allow themselves to
be manipulated.312
Contrast this with the response of broadcast news in the United States
after the release of Hillary Clinton’s emails. A study by the Columbia
Journalism Review found that “the various Clinton-related email scandals—
her use of a private email server while secretary of state, as well as the DNC
and John Podesta hacks—accounted for more sentences than all of Trump’s
scandals combined (65,000 vs. 40,000). . . .”313 More disconcerting, the study
concluded, “these 65,000 sentences were written not by Russian hackers, but
overwhelmingly by professional journalists employed at mainstream news
organizations. . . .”314
At first blush, it may appear the dissimilarities between French and
American media stem from ethics, not regulation. Put another way, American
media sources could have voluntarily elected not to devote 65,000 sentences
to Hilary Clinton’s email scandals which perhaps would have contributed
positively to Americans’ perception of the media. Even so, this oversimplifies
309
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broadcasting priorities on the networks, particularly those owned by large
conglomerates such as Sinclair that mandate coverage to the local stations.
While the United States has slashed regulation on the media in the last 30
years, France has upheld regulations on public broadcasters.315 These
regulations were passed following its prior success in combating Russian
disinformation.316
In November 2018, under the initiative of French President Macron,
France passed a law that defined the term fake news. The regulation defined
the term as “[i]nexact allegations or imputations, or news that falsely report
facts, with the aim of changing the sincerity of a vote.”317 A second part of
the law mandates that social media establish a tool for users to flag
disinformation.318 Moreover, the new legislation allows the Higher
Audiovisual Council, the French broadcast regulator, to revoke the broadcast
rights of television and radio stations found to be disseminating
misinformation.319
After Macron was elected, despite efforts by the Russian government
to elect his opponent, the French government issued a 200 page report
concerning the danger of information manipulation aimed at informing other
countries what it had learned as a result of Russian interference.320 One
striking conclusion was that “[o]ne of the reasons why the Macron Leaks
failed to have an effect on the 2017 French presidential elections . . . is that
the French media ecosystem is relatively healthy.”321 The report also found
that “distrust in institutions was one of the main reasons for the rise and
effectiveness of attempts at information manipulation.”322 In determining
why the Russian disinformation campaign failed in France but succeeded in
315
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the United States, the report posited “[c]ompared with other countries,
especially the US and the UK, France presents a less vulnerable [ ] media
environment for a number of reasons.”323 One reason may be that public trust
of French media is high, a trust in which regulations, among other factors,
play a role.
Perhaps no country is more cognizant of the affect disinformation can
have on its citizens than Germany.324 Under the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, codified after World War II, German citizens and press
are guaranteed “the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in
speech, writing and pictures . . . .”325 The decision to protect freedom of the
press was born out of the atrocities of World War II.326 With the protections
of the press and freedom of speech, Germany has also determined a
fundamental need exists to guarantee diversity in mass media.327
Article 41 of the Treaty governs the programming principles of
broadcasters, and it mandates that broadcasters must “respect human dignity
as well as the moral, religious and ideological beliefs of others. They should
promote social cohesion in unified Germany and international understanding
and should work toward a non-discriminatory society.”328 Article 56
mandates: “Providers of telemedia including journalistic edited offers . . . are
required to include in their offers without delay the reply of the person or
institution who is affected by an assertion of fact made in their offer at no
cost to the person affected.”329
In Canada, under the Broadcasting Act, the broadcasting system
should “serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social
323
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and economic fabric of Canada.”330 Canada requires that any station licensed
to broadcast must “provide a reasonable opportunity for the public to be
exposed to the expression of differing views on matter of public concern.”331
This language in the Canadian Broadcasting Act is strikingly similar to what
the United States’ Fairness Doctrine once required of broadcasters: “to
provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
viewpoints on such issues.”332 Moreover, the Canadian Broadcasting Act
requires that the broadcasting system “shall be effectively owned and
controlled by Canadians;” enacted to enhance local content on Canadian
broadcasting.333
Conversely, the absence of local content rules in the United States
means that large media conglomerates, like Sinclair Broadcasting Group, can
mandate national coverage in the local market. The Fairness Doctrine
required broadcast licensees to “provide coverage of vitally important
controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees . . .
.”334 However, each “must-run” that Sinclair mandates its local stations air
focusing on national issues reduces the time the station has available to
devote to local issues.
Yet one country stands above the rest in terms of public trust in the
media. Denmark, regulated by the Press Council, was polled as the most
transparent country in terms of distinguishing fact from fiction in
reporting.335 Denmark enjoys freedom of speech, guaranteed under Section
77 of its constitution.336 Not unlike the United States, legal liability exists for
libel, but the Danish press largely operates independent from government
oversight.337 The Danish media in broadcast, print, and online are regulated
under the Danish Press Council; members are appointed by the Supreme
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Court and journalist association.338 Participation in the Council is mandatory
and if a journalist is found by the Council to have committed an ethical
violation, the journalist can be sentenced to a fine or jail, though such
sanctions are rare.339
In each country, freedom of the press is guaranteed but regulations
protect the public from disinformation and fake news. Regulating broadcast
news in the United States could have similar results while remaining within
the confines of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Broadcast news can inform the public, but it also can spread
disinformation. Under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters once served as
“public trustees” charged with providing fair and objective news to
consumers. Yet deregulation led to a steep decline in public trust of
broadcasters. An Independent Broadcast Council could provide the solution.
An amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act could expand its scope to
encompass a voluntary regulatory council tasked with upholding the
standards of fairness and accuracy in broadcast. The media’s role is to inform,
but it cannot do so without credibility. An Independent Broadcast Council
would serve as an initial step toward restoring public perception of the media,
and the framework exists to implement it.
European countries have adopted legislation to combat fake news and
address the “public trustee” component of broadcast news. The United States
can follow the same approach and do so within existing law. Despite
objections that regulating broadcasters would run afoul of the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has long held that free speech
is the right of listeners, not broadcasters. Broadcasters have long had a duty
to serve as “public trustees.” Yet the question remains whether broadcasters
will choose to fulfil that duty or allow it to remain a relic of history.
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